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INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Annual Lecture to be presented to the Society for Advanced 
Legal Studies was given by Cherie Booth QC on 29 October 2001.
On the second day of this month, the Human Rights Act 
turned one. On this, the anniversary of its 
commencement, it is timely to look back and reflect on its 
first year. For lawyers and judges alike, the Act has clearly 
been the "tidal wave" that Lord Woolf predicted would 
transform the legal landscape. It certainly has had a 
revolutionary effect on our way of thinking and has proved 
to be the single most significant change to legal practice 
since the invigoration of equity into the common law so 
many centuries ago.J o
Its substantive social effect has been similarly pervasive. 
Unquestionably, it has done far more than provide the field 
day for crackpots, the pain in the neck for judges and 
legislators, and the goldmine for lawyers that Lord McCluskey 
so pessimistically predicted of it. The passing of the Act has 
plainly led, in many cases, to the recognition and protection 
of fundamental rights that would have otherwise gone 
unrecognised and unprotected. And importantly, it appears 
that the Human Rights Act has begun to pervade society at 
large, not just our courtrooms. Its existence and the concepts 
that underpin it are beginning to become increasingly familiar 
and recognised in the community as a whole. That is what is 
truly needed if the Act is to achieve its ultimate aim, of 
creating a more equal and just society in which human rights 
are respected as a matter of culture and of course.
Aside from its social impact, the Human Rights Act 
experience in the last twelve months makes for an 
interesting legal analysis for us as administrative law 
practitioners. In particular, with the coming of the Human 
Rights Act we have seen the true coming of the 
proportionality principle, a concept that has, for some 
time, hovered at the edges of administrative law. That is so7 o
even though the word "proportionality" is to be found 
nowhere in the text of the Human Rights Act itself nor in the 
Convention. But quite clearly proportionality now lies at 
the heart of the Act and, for the first time, is the subject of 
daily debate in our courts when decisions of public 
authorities are under review.
It is the intention of this paper to:
  Explain the context in which human rights cases arise;
  briefly introduce the concept of proportionality;
  provide a synopsis of its traditional role in British law;
  briefly study its interpretation in some foreign 
jurisdictions; and
  analyse its application by UK Courts under the Human 
Rights Act in the last twelve months.
This, it is hoped, will not only be of interest to 
administrative law practitioners who regularly litigate or 
advise on cases involving the Human Rights Act, but to all 
administrative law practitioners given the possible impact 
the Act   in bringing proportionality to the fore   may 
have on the traditional grounds of judicial review.
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: THE 
SEARCH FOR A BALANCE
As any cursory examination of the human rights cases 
decided in the last twelve months will reveal, at the heart 
of the HRA lies a search for the fair balance between rights 
and freedoms. 1 As we all know, rights and freedoms are 
rarely absolute concepts. It is truism that the freedom of 
one person to swing their arm extend where another 
person's nose begins. Rights compete against each other, 
and against the interests of society of a whole. The right to
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privacy conflicts with the right to freedom of expression, 
the right to a fair trial with the interests of society in 
convicting criminals. Human rights are rarely, if ever, black 
and white issues   rather, they involve difficult and often 
controversial value judgments upon which reasonable 
minds may differ. Lord Steyn eluded to this when he made 
the following comments in Brown, 2 a case decided under 
the Human Rights Act shortly before last Christmas:
"... democratic government has only one raison d'etre, 
namely to serve the interests of all the people. The inspirers of 
the European Convention, among whom Winston Churchill 
played an important role, and thejramers of the European 
Convention, ably assisted by English draftsmen, realised that from 
time to time the fundamental right of one individual may conflict 
with the human right of another. Thus the principles offree 
speech and privacy may collide. They realised only too well that a 
single-minded concentration on the pursuit offundamental rights 
ofindhiduals to the exclusion of the interests of the wider public 
might be subversive of the ideal ojtolerant European liberal 
democracies. The fundamental rights of individuals are of 
supreme importance but those rights are not unlimited: we live in 
a community of individuals who also have rights. "
These competing rights and interests are balanced, and 
measured against each other, by applying the principle of 
proportionality. The European Court of Human Rights 
explained the underlying essence of the principle in the 
Soering case 3 when it said that the court must:
"search for the fair balance between the demands of the general 
interests of the community and the requirements of the protection 
of the individual's human rights".
Reduced to its simplest form, the principle requires that 
interference with a Convention right be proportionate to 
the legitimate aim being pursued by interfering with the 
right. As the Court of Appeal said in May in Aston Nantlow, 
it "calls for consideration of the appropriateness of the measure to 
the need which it is designed to meet". 4 Thus, judges are now 
required to assess the protection of rights within a 
framework of community interest. The legitimacy of the 
aim pursued by the legislation or decision in question must 
now be considered openly and expressly by the court in all 
cases that come before it. This is a rather significant 
change from the traditional basis for judicial review   the 
famous Wednesbury test5   that allowed the court to 
intervene in an administrative decision only if the decision 
was, on its face, so perverse or irrational that no reasonable 
decision-maker could have reached it. The nature of this 
change is discussed further below.
THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF 
PROPORTIONALITY IN BRITISH COURTS
British courts have traditionally not had much occasion 
to develop a jurisprudence of proportionality because, 
unlike many European jurisdictions such as Germany and 
France, lack of proportionality is not a ground upon which
an administrative decision can be directly challenged in 
this country. Although in 1984 Eord Diplock suggested 
that it could be adopted as a free standing ground for 
judicial review in English law, 6 and despite many other calls 
by judges and commentators tor it to play such a role, the 
House of Eords made it clear a decade ago in R v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind'1 that it is not 
a free standing head of judicial review in British law.
At times however, especially where human rights have 
been involved, 8 the application of Wednesbury irrationality 
in tradition judicial review has closely resembled the 
application of proportionality, and on many occasions the 
result of applying either test would have been identical. 
Thus, in Attorney-General v Guardian (No. 2j, 9 Lord Goff was 
able to say:
"It was established in the jurisprudence of the [ECHR] that . . 
. interference with freedom of expression should be no more than 
is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. I have no reason 
to believe that English law, as applied in the courts, leads to any 
different conclusion."
Lord Steyn made similar remarks in May in ex parte 
Daly 10 but went on to note that there is a real difference 
between Wednesbury and proportionality:
". . . there is an overlap between the traditional grounds of 
review and the approach of proportionality. Most cases would be 
decided in the same way whichever approach is adopted. But the 
intensity of review is somewhat greater under the proportionality 
approach [such that] . . . the differences in approach between the 
traditional grounds of review and the proportionality approach 
may therefore sometimes yield different results". ] '
Clearly there is a fundamental difference between the 
tests: as Lord Justice Simon Brown noted in ex parte Smith 12 
  the famous "gays in the army case"   under the 
Wednesbury test the court exercises a mere secondary 
judgment, acting with reticence, while under the Human 
Rights Act the court must make a more primary judgment, 
closer to an analysis of the merits of the decision.
The Lord Chancellor commented prior to the 
commencement of the Act:
"The court's decisions will be based on a more overtly 
principled, and perhaps moral, basis. The court will look at the 
positive right . . . Moreover, the courts will in this area have to 
apply the Convention principle of proportionality. This means the 
Court will be looking substantively at that question. It will not 
be limited to a secondary review of the decision-making process 
but at the primary question of the merits of the decision itself."
Lord Steyn made a similar observation prior to the 
commencement of the Act:
"An assessment of the weight of moral values, such as the 
dictates of individualised justice as against considerations of 
stability and order, will be of the essence of decision making under 
the Act."
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Although these comments remain true, it is important to 
emphasise, as Lord Slynn did in Alconbury^ and Lord 
Justice Waller did only a fortnight ago in the recent 
McLellan case, 14 that proportionality does not require, nor 
justify, merits review. The Human Rights Act is not a 
mandate for the courts to step into the shoes of the 
decision-maker and substitute their own decision if they 
disagree on the merits, in every case that comes before 
them. Quite rightly, the courts to date have followed the 
general Strasbourg approach and recognised that the 
degree to which the merits of the decision itself requires 
review will depend, among other things, on the nature of 
the right in dispute. 15 In some cases, the Courts have 
considered it to make its own decision on the merits as 
part of its reviewing process, 16 but in other cases the 
courts have applied a test closer on the spectrum to the 
Wednesbury reasonableness test and illustrated that, even 
applying proportionality, deference to the decision-maker 
is the proper course in many cases. 17
THE CHALLENGE TO BRITISH COURTS
Despite this overlap and despite the perhaps subtle 
influence of proportionality in traditional judicial review, it 
has never been a concept applied directly in British 
administrative law. That is not to say that direct 
application of the concept is totally new for British courts, 
for they have on occasion been required to apply 
proportionality in the EC law context, where it is a 
fundamental principle. 18
But it is really not possible to say that the English courts 
have had opportunity to consistently apply the doctrine of 
proportionality to a variety of factual scenarios. That is why 
the Human Rights Act, in making it a central principle, has 
presented such a monumental challenge to our lawyers and 
to our courts.
There is, however, certainly no shortage of international 
jurisprudence available to guide English courts as they 
develop an English jurisprudence of proportionality under 
the Human Rights Act. Obviously, the concept has been at 
the heart of the European Convention since its inception 
and the European Court of Human Rights has produced a 
generation of case law interpreting and applying it. And as 
well as playing an important role in the administrative law 
of many European countries, proportionality is a concept 
which has been interpreted and applied in Canada, New 
Zealand and South Africa under their various human rights 
instruments. To these jurisdictions, this paper will turn 
shortly. But first, it is logical to inspect the application of 
proportionality by the European Court under the 
Convention.
PROPORTIONALITY UNDER THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Under the Convention, the European Court of Human 
Rights is often required to assess whether the interference
with a qualified human right can be justified as being 
"necessary in a democratic society". Because the doctrine 
of proportionality is applied in making that assessment, it 
has become an inherent part of the Convention 
jurisprudence. Quite logically, since the Human Rights Act 
adopts the Convention, that jurisprudence is of primary 
guidance to British courts. Our courts have already made 
clear their intention to rely upon Convention and EC law 
jurisprudence on proportionality. Lord Steyn, for example, 
said this recently in R v. A 19 :
"The criteria Jor determining the test of proportionality have 
been analysed . ... in the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities and the European Court of Human 
Rights. It is not necessary Jor us to re-invent the wheel. "
So, how is proportionality interpreted in Convention 
law? It is a fluid concept that has been applied differently 
at times, but it is nevertheless possible to distil the 
elements of the accepted test. The principle is well 
summarised by the three-fold test applied in Sunday Times v 
United Kingdom, 20 where the European Court of Human 
Rights asked the following questions:
  Is the interference complained of corresponded to a 
pressing social need?
  Is the interference proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued? And
  Are the reasons given to justify the interference relevant 
and sufficient?
The ECHR jurisprudence has also made it clear that 
proportionality is applied with varying degrees of strictness 
depending on the particular context of the case: in those 
cases where fundamental rights are involved, the court 
applies a more stringent test in those cases where property 
rights are involved than those in which mere property 
rights are concerned. 21
And, although it is not explicitly recognised by 
Convention case law, in practice the court often applies 
what has been termed by commentators as the "least 
restrictive means" test, whereby the court will deem a 
measure disproportionate if the objective sought to be 
achieved could in fact have been achieved by a measure 
causing lesser impact on fundamental rights. 22
PROPORTIONALITY UNDER THE 
CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS, THE 
NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION
The jurisprudence of proportionality in Canada has 
resulted from the need to decide disputes arising under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights, which guarantees the rights 
and freedoms set out in it but "only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in 
a free and democratic society".
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Similarly, in New Zealand, the Bill of Rights provides 
that its rights and freedoms "may be subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society".
In South Africa, section 35(1) of the Constitution 
contains a similar proportionality test, but one which is 
more explicit in outlining the relevant factors to be 
considered by the court. It provides that the rights in the 
Bill of Rights:
"... may be limited only in terms of laws of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality andjreedom, having regard to all relevant Jactors 
including-
(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relationship between the limitation and its purpose; 
and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose."
In all three of these jurisdictions, the courts have applied 
their expressions of the proportionality principle in a very 
similar manner, which in turn closely resembles the 
application under the Convention by the European Court 
of Human Rights. The principles to be distilled from the 
case law of these jurisdictions suggest that, for a measure
I OO '
to be proportionate, a number of conditions have to be 
satisfied:
(1) the objective sought to be achieved is necessary, is the 
sense that it is pressing and substantial and 
sufficiently important to possibly justify interference 
with an individual's right or freedom;
(2) the measure interfering with the fundamental right is 
rationally connected to that objective;
(3) the measure is necessary to achieve the objective, in 
the sense that it is the least drastic measure that could 
possibly be employed to achieve the objective; and
(4) the restriction is proportionate (in the strict sense of 
the word) to the measure in that it does not impose 
harm that is excessive to the importance of the 
objective.
PROPORTIONALITY UNDER THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS ACT: THE EXPERIENCE SO FAR
So, what has the experience here been? How have the 
British courts applied proportionality in the last twelve 
months? Have they followed Convention jurisprudence 
and the approach in New Zealand, Canada and South 
Africa?
It is timely to look at some of the decisions.
Mclntosh
The judgment of the Privy Council in the Mclntosh case23 
was handed down in February. The case concerned the 
appeal of a Scottish man who had been convicted of 
supplying heroin. Following his conviction, "confiscation 
proceedings" were commenced against him to strip him of 
the assets he generated by supplying drugs.
Under the Scottish legislation that authorises such 
proceedings, the court is permitted to draw assumptions 
that certain assets possessed by the convicted person are 
the product of his or her drug crimes, and order the 
confiscation of those assets accordingly.
Mr Mclntosh argued that these assumptions, which the
legislation permitted the court to draw, violated one of the or '
"fair trial" rights under the European Convention, namely 
his right under Article 6(2), which provides:
"Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed 
innocent until proved Quilty according to law. "
Mr Mclntosh argued that, if assumptions about the 
connection of his assets to his illegal activity could 
automatically be made adversely against him, he was, in 
effect, not being presumed innocent such that Article 6(2) 
had been violated.
Although the Privy Council decided that Article 6(2) did 
not in fact apply to Mr Mclntosh at all   because the 
proceeding was not on in which he was "charged with a 
criminal offence"   nevertheless it went on to consider 
whether, if it did apply, Mr Mclntosh's Convention rights 
would have been violated. In doing so the Court noted that 
what was required was a balancing act   a need to measure 
the general interest of the community in discouraging drug 
crime and stripping offenders of assets earned by that 
crime, against the right of an individual to a fair trial.
The Privy Council held that, in the circumstances of this 
case, the legislation's intrusion on the presumption of 
innocence was proportionate. The Privy Council noted that 
the degree to which the legislation impaired the 
presumption of innocence was relatively small   the 
presumptions against the defendant could only be made in 
circumstances where he had already been convicted of a 
serious crime, and the defendant could rebut these 
presumptions with evidence.
On the other hand   the other half of the balancingo
exercise   the aim pursued by the legislation was a legitimate 
one. The Privy Council commented that drug trafficking is 
a very serious social evil and noted that offenders 
notoriously hide their proceeds, thereby concluding that the 
legislation furthered the legitimate aim of protecting the 
community. On the balance, when the legitimate aim was 
measured against the degree of intrusion on the individual's 
right, the legislation was held to be proportionate.
It is important to note that the Court emphasised that 
the right given by Article 6(2) is not an absolute one, but
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rather one which could be qualified in the context of a 
legitimate community interest. There is a connection 
between the qualified nature of a right and the extent to 
which it may properly be violated.
Brown
The Brown case24 concerned a Scottish woman who was 
suspected of stealing a bottle of gin from a 24-hour store. 
When the police arrived at the store, she suggested to1 7 oo
them that she had driven there. She was charged with theft
o
and taken to the police station where, pursuant to their 
powers under Scottish legislation, the police required her 
to state who was driving her car shortly before the alleged
o > o
theft occurred. She told them it was her and she was 
accordingly charged with drink driving, her blood alcohol 
level having exceeded the legal limit.
o o
Miss Brown argued that the legislation that required her 
to answer the police officer's question as to the identity of 
the driver of the car was contrary to Article 6(1) of the 
European Convention, which reads:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of 
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair 
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law. "
Miss Brown argued that an established aspect of this 
right to a fair trial was the right to remain silent and not
o o
incriminate herself.
However, like in Mclntosh, the court held that the right 
to silence and privilege against self-incrimination were not 
absolute, but rather could, depending on the degree to 
which they were violated and the legitimacy of the goal 
pursued by doing so, be qualified.
The Privy Council in this case applied a similar reasoning 
process as was later applied in the Mclntosh case.
Here, the Privy Council thought that the rights were not 
severely impaired because:
  Firstly, the answer to the question itself, without more, 
could not convict the accused. It related only to the 
identity of the driver and not the nature of the driving. 
It was only if it could also be established that Miss 
Brown had been drinking that she could be convicted;o '
  Secondly, there was in this case no suggestion that she 
had been coerced into providing the answer, so that its 
reliability was not in dispute;
  Thirdly, the power could only be exercised by or on 
behalt ot a chief officer of police; and
  Fourthly, the admission was not necessarily final and 
conclusive.
Applying the balancing exercise, the Privy Council 
thought that the intrusion on the presumption of 
innocence was not a disproportionate legislative response
to the problem of road safety, and that an appropriate 
balance had been struck between the interests of the 
community in preventing drink driving and the right of the 
individual to a fair trial. Lord Steyn, in reaching his 
conclusion, -referred to statistics on the number of fatal 
and serious car accidents in recent years. The use of this 
type of social data is something that will no doubt become 
common in deciding HRA cases in which a proportionality 
judgment is required.
Wilson
A case in which the interference with the right was 
considered disproportionate to the objective pursued by 
such interference was Wilson, 2 ^ decided by the Court of 
Appeal in May 2001. The Court was required to consider 
the compatibility with the Convention of provisions of the 
Consumer Credit Act 1974, which had the effect that if a 
pawnbroker did not ensure that loan documentation was 
completed in the prescribed manner, he or she lost the 
ability to enforce the security for such loan. The court 
noted that the objective being pursued   that of ensuring 
customers of pawnbrokers turned their attention to the 
terms and conditions of the contract   was a legitimate 
one, the measures taken by the Parliament to achieve that 
objective were not proportionate to it. Even recognising 
that it is appropriate to defer some degree of latitude to 
Parliament, the Court of Appeal held that the inflexible 
measures taken by Parliament here were excessive. The 
Court was unable to deduce why Parliament though itJ o
necessary to impose such drastic consequences upon the 
pawnbroker for a failure to ensure paperwork was fully 
completed; there were other less drastic measures, such as 
judicial control, to protect the rights of customers. 
Although the Court of Appeal did not explicitly refer to it 
as such, the decision exemplifies the "least drastic 
measure" test applied in other jurisdictions. 26 The balance 
had not been appropriately struck and, because the court 
was unable to give an interpretation to the provision which 
would make it compatible with the Convention, the Court 
of Appeal issued a declaration of incompatibility in relation 
to it, one of only three such declarations issued to date.
Proportionality was also found to not exist in the case of 
Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billeslev Parochial Church 
Council v Wallbank and another, 2 '1 a case decided in May. In 
this case the freehold owners of certain glebe land
o
challenged their liability under an old common law to pay 
the costs of keeping the parish church in repair. The court 
noted that this liability' was imposed arbitrarily and 
discriminatorily, for the obligation to pay had no necessary 
connection with the parish itself. The Court queried 
whether the common law rule in question violated the 
Convention, and said:
"The turns on proportionality. Proportionality, in the 
jurisprudence both of the European Court of Human Rights and 
of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, calls jor a
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consideration of the appropriateness of the measure to the need 
which it is designed to meet. The need here is the legitimate one 
of maintaining historic buildings in the public interest. The 
means employed, however, are a tax . . . levied exclusively on the 
owners of the land which hasjor centuries been divorced from the 
system of rights and responsibilities with which ecclesiastical law 
clothed the rectories of which the land once formed part. " 28
The court   again without specifically referring to the 
principle as such   seems to apply some form of the "least 
drastic means" test, by referring to fact that the state
possesses a large choice of measure to control the use or r o
property or to redistribute wealth. It would have been 
possible for the state to achieve its legitimate objective of 
upkeeping historic buildings by imposing one of many 
other forms of taxation in which a closer relationship was 
achieved between the form of taxation and that objective.
In R v A, Lord Hope of Craighead seemed to expressly 
endorse the "least drastic measure" test:
"The question is whether these provisions have achieved a fair 
balance. This will be achieved if they do not go beyond what is 
necessary to accomplish their objective. That is the essence, in 
this context, of the principle of proportionality. " 29
And in one of the most recent HRA cases, Samaroo, 30 
Lord Justice Dyson made it clear that it is important 
question for the court to address, saying that the question 
at the first stage is "can the objective of the measure be achieved 
by means which are less interfering of an individual's rights?\
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
Decisions such as Brown andMdntosh show that political, 
social and moral philosophy cannot be divorced from 
human rights. And because of this, the view of the 
democratic legislature should always be taken very 
seriously on these issues. At times the courts have rightly 
recognised this in applying proportionality   that it is 
appropriate to defer to Parliament when considering 
whether rights and responsibilities have been properly 
weighed against each other. For example, in R v A, Lord 
Hopehead said:
"It is plain that the question is in the end one of balance. 
Has the balance between the protection of the complainant and 
the accused's right to a fair trial been struck in the right place? . 
. . if any doubt remains on the matter, it raises thejurther 
question whether Parliament acted within its discretionary area of 
judgment when it was choosing the point ojbalance indicated by 
s41. The area is one whether Parliament was better equipped 
than the judges are to decide where the balance lay. The judges 
are well able to assess the extent to which the restriction will 
inhibit questioning or the leading of evidence. But it seems to me 
that in this highly sensitive and carefully researched field an 
assessment of the prejudice to the wider interests of the community 
if the restrictions were not to take that form was more appropriate 
for Parliament. An important factor for Parliament to consider
was the extent to which restrictions were needed in order to restore 
and maintain public confidence". 31
And:
"/ would take, as my starting point . . . the proposition that 
there are areas of law which lie within the discretionary area of 
judgment which the court ought to accord to the legislature. As I 
said in . . . Kebeline . . .it is appropriate in some circumstances 
for the judiciary to defer, on democratic grounds, to the considered 
opinion of the elected body as to where the balance is to be struck 
between the rights of the individual and the needs of society. "32
Lord Woolf CJ expressed a similar opinion in R v Lambert 
and others^'.
"It is . . . important to have in mind that legislation is passed 
by a democratically elected Parliament and therefore the courts 
under the convention are entitled to and should, as a matter of 
constitutional principle, pay a degree of deference to the view of 
Parliament as to what is in the interest of the public generally 
when upholding the rights of the individual under the 
convention."
The courts have rightly recognised that in some fields 
more than others, Parliament should be granted a degree 
of latitude. Where the issue at stake is one in which 
Parliament has specifically considered and legislated 
specifically to reflect the will of the electorate, the courts 
are less likely to declare the measure disproportionate. 34 
Where, however, the courts are themselves most qualified 
to judge the necessity of a provision, such as those which 
regulate court procedure, or where the interference relates 
to a fundamental right of high constitutional importance 
such as the right to freedom from torture, the courts will 
afford Parliament a lesser degree of latitude. 35 For 
example, in R v A, Lord Steyn made the comment:
"Clearly the House must give weight to the decision of 
Parliament. ... On the other hand, when the question arises 
whether in the criminal statute in question Parliament adopted a 
legislative scheme which makes an excessive inroad into the right 
to a fair trial the court is qualified to make its own judgment and 
must do so". 36
As recently as 11 October 2001 the same sentiments are 
to found in the judgment of Lord Hoffman in Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v Rehman^1 concerning the 
power of the Secretary of State to deport suspected 
terrorists. Mr Rehman was a Pakistani national with 
temporary leave to stay in the United Kingdom. A security 
service assessment concluded that he was involved with an 
Islamic terrorist organisation, and that while it was 
unlikely that he would commit acts of violence in the 
United Kingdom, his activities here were intended too '
further the cause of a terrorist organisation abroad. Ono
that basis, the Secretary of State concluded that Mr 
Rehman posed a threat to national security and that he 
should therefore be deported. The Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission held on appeal that a person
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offended against national security only if he engaged in, 
promoted or encouraged violent activities targeted at the 
United Kingdom, its system of government or its people. 
That decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal and 
by the House of Lords.
Lord Hoffman in his speech 38 said this:
"In my opinion the fundamentalflaw in the reasoning ojthe 
Commission was that although they correctly said that section 
4(1) gave them full jurisdiction to decide questions ofJact and 
law, they did not make sufficient allowance for certain inherent 
limitations, first, in the powers of the judicial branch of 
government and secondly, within the judicial Junction, in the 
appellate process. First, the limitations on the judicial power. 
These arise from the principle of the separation of powers. The 
Commission is a court, a member of the judicial branch of 
government. It was created as such to comply with article 6 of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (1953) (Cmnd 8969). However broad the jurisdiction 
of a court or tribunal, whether at first instance or on appeal, it is 
exercising a judicial function and the exercise of that function 
must recognise the constitutional boundaries between judicial, 
executive and legislative power. Secondly, the limitations on the 
appellate process. They arise from the need, in matters of 
judgment and evaluation of evidence, to show proper deference to 
the primary decision-maker."
These comments show that the approach of British 
courts under the Human Rights Act will be similar to that 
adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court under the 
Canadian Charter, expressed in the following words:
"This Court has pointed out on a number of occasions that in 
the social, economic and political spheres, where the legislature 
must reconcile competing interests in choosing one policy among 
several that might be acceptable, the courts must accord great 
deference to the legislature's choice because it is in the best 
position to make such a choice. On the other hand, the courts 
will judge the legislature's choice more harshly in areas where the 
government plays the role of the 'singular antagonist of the 
individual   primarily in criminal matters owing to their expertise 
in this area . . .'". 39
Justice La Forest similarly explained in RJR-McDonald Inc
v Canada 64-Gj 40 :
"Courts are specialists in the protection of liberty and the 
interpretation of legislation and are, accordingly, well places to 
subject criminal justice legislation to careful scrutiny. However, 
courts are not specialists in the realm of policy making, nor 
should they be. This is a role properly assigned to the elected 
representatives of the people, who have at their disposal the 
necessary institutional resources to enable them to compile and 
assess social science evidence, to mediate between competing social 
interests and protect vulnerable groups. "
Interestingly, though, the House of Lords in R v A was 
not in agreement as to whether the issue in question was 
one in which Parliament, or the Courts, were most
qualified to decide on the appropriate balance between 
rights and community interests. In that case, the issue was
o J '
whether it was legitimate for legislation to preclude an
accused charged with rape from cross-examining theor o
complainant about her sexual history. Lord Hopehead 
concluded that the areas was one where Parliament was 
better equipped than the judges to decide where the 
balance lay; in his opinion it was a highly sensitive and 
carefully researched field which involves an assessment of 
prejudice to wider interests of the community, and that it 
was an important factor for Parliament to consider the 
extent to which restrictions were needed in order to 
restore and maintain public confidence.41 Lord Steyn 
however noted that in a criminal statute when the question 
arises as to whether Parliament has made excessive inroads 
into the right to a fair trial, the court is qualified to make 
its own judgment and must do so. 42
And while the courts have shown a willingness to defer 
to Parliament, they have also made it clear that they will 
not do so blindly and that they are prepared to analyse the 
reasons Parliament considered a particular measure 
necessary. The courts have emphasised that deference is 
not the same as unquestioning acceptance. In Wilson for 
example, the court noted:
"It is one thing to accept the need to defer to an opinion which 
can bee seen to be the product of reasoned consideration based on 
policy; it is quite another thing to be required to accept, without 
question an opinion for which no reason of policy is advanced. " 4 ^
The court in that case attempted to understand why 
Parliament had enacted what it considered to be an 
excessive measure to achieve its objective, but being unable 
to answer that question after looking at material such as 
Parliamentary debates, it concluded that the measure was 
disproportionate. In contrast, in R v Lambert and others, 
Lord Woolf expressly stated that he could "well 
understand" why, in light of the legitimate social aim being 
pursued, Parliament interfered with the right in question 
in that case and the manner in which it did so.
The line between proper deference to Parliament, and 
improper intrusion on the sovereignty of Parliament and 
discretion of a decision maker, is a fine one. On the right7 o
balance, opinions will differ. But the coming of the 
Human P\ights Act should not be seen as a licence for the
o
judiciary to usurp executive and legislative power. In 
.Brine/, 44 Lord Lowry warned of the dangers of 
proportionality:
"(I) The decision-makers, very often elected, are those to 
whom Parliament has entrusted the discretion and to interfere 
with that discretion beyond the limits as hitherto defined would 
itself be an abuse of the judges'supervisory jurisdiction. (2) The 
judges are not, generally speaking, equipped by training or 
experience, or furnished with the requisite knowledge and advice, 
to decide the answer to an administrative problem where the scales 
are evenly balanced, but they have a much better chance of
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reaching the right answer where the question is put in a 
Wednesburyjorm . . . (3) Stability and relative certainty would 
be jeopardised if the new doctrine held sway, because there is 
nearly always something to be said against an administrative 
decision and parties who felt aggrieved would be even more likely 
than at present to try their luck with judicial review application . 
. . (4) The increase in applications Jbr judicial review of 
administrative action (inevitable if the threshold of 
unreasonableness is lowered) will lead to the expenditure of time 
and money by litigants, not to speak of the prolongation of 
uncertainty Jbr all concerned with the decisions in questions, and 
the taking up of court time which could otherwise be devoted to 
other matters. The losers in this respect will be members of the 
public, Jbr whom the courts provide a service".
Although these comments were made in the context of 
rejecting proportionality as a new ground of judicial 
review, the dangers of which Lord Lowry warned remain 
relevant under the Human Rights Act. Proportionality can 
be taken too far and the courts must be wary not to go too 
far, even under the greater scope afforded to them under 
the Human Rights Act. A degree of judicial reticence is 
required. The courts should not see the Act as a licence to 
superimpose their own opinions for those of Parliament 
or decision-makers, for a margin of discretion should 
remain with them. The extent of that latitude will depend 
on many factors, such as the nature of the fundamental 
right in question, but as Lord Steyn pointed out in Da/y,45 
under the Human Rights Act there has not been a shift to 
merits review. The roles of judges, legislators and 
administrators are distinct and must remain so. This is 
inherent in the entire scheme of the Human Rights Act.
AN IMPACT ON THE TRADITIONAL BASIS 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW?
So it is clear that proportionality lies at the heart of the 
Human Rights Act, and that our courts are applying die 
concept consistently with the manner in which it is 
applied under Convention law, and in foreign 
jurisdictions. And it is possible that, as our courts become 
more comfortable with the concept, proportionality may 
begin to pervade areas of law other dian human rights. In 
particular, despite the views of those such as Lord Lowry 
who have voiced fears of the danger of doing so, it may be 
that the Human Rights Act is the catalyst that causes 
proportionality to be accepted as an independent head of 
judicial review in administrative law.
In this respect, Lord Cooke's comments in ex parte Daly are 
interesting:
o
". . . I think that the day will come when it will be more 
widely recognised that Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v 
Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 was an 
unfortunately retrogressive decision in English administrative law, 
insofar as it is suggested that there are degrees of 
unreasonableness and that only a very extreme degree can bring 
an administrative decision within the legitimate scope ojjudicial
invalidation. The depth of judicial review and the deference due 
to administrative discretion vary with the subject matter. It may 
well be, however, that the law can never be satisfied in any 
administrative field merely by a finding that the decision under 
review is not capricious or absurd. "
Lord Slynn has similarly advocated a wider role for 
proportionality, saying in Alconbury46 :
".. .even without reference to the Human Rights Act the time 
has come to recognise that this principle (of proportionality) is 
part of English administrative law, not only when judges are 
dealing with Community Acts but also when they are dealing 
with acts subject to domestic law. "
Time will tell, but watch this space. @
Cherie Booth QC, Barrister-at-Law and founding 
member of Matrix chambers.
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Privacy and celebrity 2
by Michael Tugendhat QC
The author concludes his two-part study of privacy and celebrity by posing the 
vention of whether claims hsould be brought in libel or confidentiality.
ya s things stand, the lawyers choose the cause of 
L\ action depending on what the client says about the 
JL JLtruth of the information. If the client says the 
allegation is false, the claim is brought in libel. If the client 
says it is true, it is brought in confidentiality. But should 
the claimant have to say whether he has an eating disorder 
or not? And what if the publication complained of is a 
gross exaggeration? Suppose the client has only a small or 
temporary eating disorder, which cause of action does he 
choose? Does he have to confirm or deny?
THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW ON PERSONAL 
INFORMATION
These questions cannot be answered by citation of 
precedent. Judges will be guided by principle. So there are 
other prior questions of a higher order. Why has English 
law hitherto regarded truth as justifying publication of 
almost all personal information? What are the values of 
freedom of expression and reputation protected by libel? 
What are the values protected by privacy laws?
The value of reputation
It is easy to start with libel. The answer has been given 
by Lord Nicholls in Reynolds v Times [1999] 3 WLR 1010, 
1023. He said:
'Reputation is an integral and important part of the dignity of 
the individual. It also forms the basis of many decisions in a 
democratic society, which are fundamental to its well-being: 
whom to employ or work for, whom to promote, whom to do 
business with or to vote for. Once besmirched by an unfounded 
allegation in a national newspaper, a reputation can be damaged 
forever, especially if there is no opportunity to vindicate one's 
reputation. When this happens, society as well as the individual 
is the loser. For it should not be supposed that protection of 
reputation is a matter of importance only to the affected 
individual and his family. Protection of reputation is conducive to 
the public good. It is in the public interest that the reputation of 
public figures should not be debased falsely. In the political field, 
in order to make an informed, choice, the electorate needs to be 
able to identify the good as well as the bad. Consistently with 
these considerations, human rights conventions recognise that
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